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1. Introduction and definition of the problem
This thesis will present the main aspects connected with the knock-for-knock clauses 
(the terms: knock-for-knock clauses, mutual hold harmless clauses and indemnity clauses are 
used here as synonyms) and will  focus on how these provisions are treated in the United 
States (US) and Norwegian legal systems. Under the mutual hold harmless indemnity regime, 
each party to the contract (as 'indemnitor') agrees to take responsibility for, and to indemnify 
the other (as 'indemnitee') against, injury and loss to its own personnel and property and its 
own 'consequential losses'. Such provisions, setting up the cross-indemnities mechanism, are 
ordinarily  intended  to  be  effective  even  if  the  accident  and  related  losses  are  caused  by 
negligence,  breach  of  statutory  duty or  breach  of  contract  of  the  party  protected  by  the 
indemnity  regime1.  The  knock-for-knock  agreements  are  very  often  used  in  the  offshore 
business due to some specific feature characterizing this activity.
First of all, it should be noted that the offshore industry is very risky and hazardous 
business with huge capital sums invested and large potential liability. The accidents can and 
do  happen  –  the  recent  Deepweather  Horizon  oil  spill  catastrophe  is  the  best  example. 
Moreover, the upstream oil and gas sector is moved gradually to the deeper and more unsafe 
regions, with heavy weather conditions and a lot of factors must be taken into consideration in 
the risk-management process. 
Another  feature  of  such  activity  is  the  involvement  of  many  contractors  and 
subcontractors  –  for  example  the  Piper  Alpha  disaster  led  to  claims  against  24  different 
contractors, where of those on board the platform who were killed, 134 were employed by 
contractors and 31 by operator; of those who survived 55 were employed by contractors and 
31 by the operator2. Such situation is a common characteristic of North Sea Oil exploitation, 
so  the  clear  distinction  between the  scope of  liability  of  each  enterprise  engaged in  this 
activity is highly required. 
Since the need for foreseeability is very strong in the offshore business, it is thus not 
surprising  that  the  industry  during  several  years  has  developed  the  mechanisms  of  risk 
allocation, known as 'knock-for-knock' agreements. Such disclaimer of liability is often based 
on the different criteria than would have followed from the general liability rules. The primary 
aim of mutual hold harmless clauses is to establish a systematic liability and insurance system 
throughout all the contracts involved in the same project where all risk for damage is financed 
1 T. Hewitt, op.cit., p. 182
2 Caledonia North Sea Limited v London Bridge Engineering Limited and Others („Piper Alpha”), 2000 
S.L.T. 1123 
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by insurance effected by the contractual party sustaining damage (the main principle of the 
knock-for-knock provisions is that damage should stay where it occurs)3. This system will 
often set rules concerning also a liability toward third parties – however,  in this case there is 
commonly an exception to the extent of the negligence of the other party and sometimes the 
exception is expressed to apply only in the case of the sole negligence of that other party4.
It  must  be  noted  that  despite  of  the  wide  application  of  the  knock-for-knock 
agreements, the particular mutual indemnity clauses may be interpreted differently in various 
countries – it concerns especially their enforceability in the case of gross negligence/wilful 
misconduct of one party. If a responsibility regulation includes a full exemption from liability 
for tortfeasor even in the case of his gross negligence or intentional act, this may come into 
conflict with the principles like fairness and reasonableness5. This problem will be the main 
issue analysed in this thesis where the various censorship in the US and Norwegian legal 
system will  be presented  together  with  the  various  arguments  that  are  submitted  in  their 
favour.  Norway and the US were chosen, because these two countries have nowadays very 
strong  position  in  the  offshore  business6 and  they  have  developed  specific  solutions 
concerning enforceability of mutual hold harmless clauses which will be discussed below.  On 
the one hand, the courts are sometimes not willing to accept that the party will be release from 
liability  if  he  acted  with  gross  negligence  or  wilful  misconduct.  On  the  other  hand, 
modification  of  such  provisions  may  have  a  very  wide-ranging  impact,  sometimes  not 
intended by the parties and might also reduce the benefits of mutual hold harmless clauses as 
such. This is why it is so important to know in which circumstances the knock-for-knock 
agreements will be upheld.
At the beginning, the short introduction concerning relevant tort and insurance law 
will  be given since these two branches of law are closely connected with the problem of 
knock-for-knock agreements. 
Then,  the general characteristic of the knock-for-knock clauses will be given. In this 
part, the general rules concerning construction of mutual hold harmless formulas as well as 
indemnity and insurance issues will be discussed. 
Afterwards, the advantages and disadvantages of such provisions will be presented. 
In the last two chapters the enforceability of the knock-for-knock provisions in the US 
3 T.-L. Wilhelmsen, Liability and insurance clauses in contracts for vessel services in the Norwegian offshore 
sector - the knock-for-knock principle, Conference paper for the Oslo/Southampton/Tulane Conferance in 
Oslo 2-3 October 2012, p. 4
4 T. Hewitt, op.cit., p. 184
5 H.J. Bull, Tredjemannsdekninger i forsikringsforhold, 1988, p. 336
6 The third system which is relevant in the context of offshore activity is English legal regime, however, it will 
stay outide the scope of this thesis.
3
and Norway will be analysed in detail. In the context of the US legal regime the main focus 
will be put on the different solutions included in the anti-indemnity statutes in Texas and 
Louisiana since law of these two states will apply the most often to the offshore contracts in  
the US waters and the very specific limitations concerning the knock-for-knock agreements 
are included in their anti-indemnity statutes. In the Norwegian context the main problem will 
be the enforceability of knock-for-knock clauses in the context of general contract law. In this 
part the enforceability of the mutual hold harmless provisions will be analysed with reference 
to the NL 5-1-2 and the Norwegian Contract Act section 36.
2. Legal sources
The analyse of knock-for-knock clauses in two different legal systems raises a number 
of particular legal sources and methodology which will be addressed below.
First of all, it must be noted that the US and Norwegian legal systems belongs to rather 
different legal traditions. The US legal regime is the part of so called “common law” where 
the customary law and case law is considered a very important source of law (however, it 
must  be  noted  that  in  contrast  to  English  common  law,  the  American  legal  system has 
increasingly introduced legislation in various jurisdiction, also in the context of contract law). 
Since  the  US is  a  federal  state,  its  legal  system consists  of  many levels  of  codified  and 
uncodified forms of law. This is the reason why both federal and state law must be considered 
here. When the problem of enforceability of knock-for-knock clauses will be analysed, three 
legal  regimes  which  may  apply  in  the  case  of  offshore  activity,  will  be  taken  into 
consideration: the general maritime law of the US and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
(OCSLA) as a federal law, and the Texas and Louisiana legislation7 as a state law (these states 
are relevant, because they are the adjacent states for the most of the offshore activity in the US 
waters). Moreover, because the US law system is based on case precedent, the focus will be 
put on the courts decisions which has a potential of establishing the rule that must be followed 
by other courts.
In the contrast to the US system, the Norwegian regime is often referred to the “civil 
law” family, however, some specific solutions have been developed here. In the context of 
Norwegian law the enforceability of the knock-for-knock agreements will be analysed based 
on the general contract law. The  NL 5-1-2 (Kong Christian Den Femtis Norske Lov av 15.  
april 1687) and the Norwegian Contract Act section 36 (Lov 31. mai 1918 nr 4 om avslutning  
av avtaler, om fuldmagt og om ugyldige viljeserklæringer (avtaleloven)  will be thus in the 
7 Texas and Louisiana Anti-indemnity Acts (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN Section 127.00 1, and 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN Section 9:2780)
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focus of an attention. The first statute forbids those agreements which are against law and 
morality (“imod Loven, eller Ærbarhed”), the second one gives the courts a possibility to 
modify or disregard agreements which are found to be unreasonable, unfair or contrary to 
good business practice.
Since Scandinavian legal systems are based on the same principles and the Norwegian 
section 36 is a result of Nordic legislative cooperation with identical rules in all the Nordic 
countries8, the references to Danish and Swedish preparatory documents to their Contract Acts 
and to relevant case law will be also done.
3. Overview over the relevant tort law and insurance law
3.1. Tort law
The knock-for-knock clauses are the provisions in which one party to the contract 
agrees to indemnify the other party against liability in tort. This is the reason why the short 
overview of the tort law is necessary before the broader analysis of the mutual hold harmless 
clauses will be done. 
Torts  is a large subject area in litigation,  in which a victim (e.g. plaintiff) seeks a 
remedy from some defendant (e.g. person, corporation, government) who harmed the victim9. 
The tort must be thus differ from breach of contract and criminal act. The common thread 
interweaving most torts is the notion that socially unreasonable conduct should be penalized 
and  those  who  are  its  victims  should  be  compensated.  Of  course,  determining  what  is 
unreasonable is a formidable task, but the overall goal is to balance the plaintiff’s need for 
protection against the defendant’s claim of freedom to pursue his own ends10.
According to Norwegian tort law, a person is liable for damage to another person if  
three  conditions  are  fulfilled:  there  must  be  a  legal  basis  for  liability,  there  must  be  an 
economic loss, and there must be legally relevant causation between the act or the omission of 
the injurer and the loss. These rules are mainly developed and stated in court practise and not 
reflected in general legislation11. The same principles existed also under the US tort law12
When we talked about the liability in tort – the three main basis of liability can be 
8 T.-L. Wilhelmsen, op.cit., p. 25
9 R.B. Standler, Elements of Torts in the USA, http://www.rbs2.com/torts.pdf 
10 L.L. Edwards, J.S. Edwards, P.K. Wells, Tort Law, Fifth Edit., 2012, p. 4
11 T.L. Wilhelmsen, op.cit., p.5
12  Restatement Second of Torts §§ 281, 328A (1965); W. Keeton edit., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of 
Torts, Fifth edit. (1984) § 30; See also Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2s 152, 155 (Colo. 1986), where the court held 
that to recover for the negligent conduct of another, a plaintiff must establish: 1) the existence of a legal duty 
owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, 2) breach of that duty, 3) injury to the plaintiff, 4) actual and 
proximate causation 
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divided – liability for negligence, strict liability and vicarious liability. The main principle of 
tort law is that some kind of fault of tortfeasor is required to invoke the liability for damages  
(fault means here ordinary negligence, gross negligence or intentional act). No fault (such as 
negligence or tortious intent) is, however, needed in the case of strict liability, however, it will 
normally  require  an  act  of  legislation13.  The  vicarious  liability  is  a  combination  of  the 
negligence and strict  liability – this  term is  used to indicate legal responsibility for other 
people's actions, especially those of employees or customers14.  For example, a company may 
be held liable for the actions of an employee, or a parent may be held liable for injury caused 
by a child. 
It  should  be  noted  that  tort  law  often  goes  beyond  compensating  individuals  and 
considers more broadly, the interests and goals of society at large – these interests are often 
referred to by the courts as public policy concerns15. This idea is the most important in the 
context of US law since the US courts often refer to the public policy principle when they 
analyse the enforceability of mutual hold harmless provisions. 
3.2. Insurance law
The main purpose of the knock-for-knock regulation in the contract is to beneﬁt from 
the  insurance  cover  effected  by  the  respective  parties.  This  is  the  reason  why the  short  
overview of relevant insurance law should be done before the proper analysis of the knock-
for-knock principles will be done. 
Insurance  in  Norway  is  regulated  by  the  Insurance  Contract  Act  (ICA).16 The 
provisions of the ICA are mandatory (Section 1-3), however there are several exclusion of this 
rule  – section 1-3 subparagraph (c) and (e)  states that  ships,  offshore units  and goods in 
international transit, including transportation to and from the Norwegian Continental Shelf are 
excluded from mandatory application of ICA. As a starting point therefore, the insurer and the 
parties to the charter parties or the drilling contracts have full contractual freedom in relation 
to the content of the insurance contract17. 
The most of the marine insurance contracts in Norway are regulated by the Norwegian 
Marine  Insurance  Plan  1996  Version  2010  (NMIP)18.  The  NMIP is  an  agreed  document, 
13 See f.e. The Norwegian Petroleum Act chapter 7, which comprehensively regulates who shall be liable for 
pollution damage. Section 7-3 of this chapter states that “the licensee is liable for pollution damage without 
regard to fault”.
14 Cambridge Dictionaries Online, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/business-english/vicarious-
liability 
15 L.L. Edwards, op.cit., p. 4
16 Act no. 69 of 16 June 1989 relating to insurance contracts.
17 T.L. Wilhelmsen, op.cit., p. 7
18 It should be noted that with the effect from 1. January 2013 the common regulation for all Scandinavian 
countries will be introduced – the Nordic Marine Insurance Plan of 2013 (Based on the NMIP 1996, Version 
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similar  to  private  legislation.  It  is  thus  non  mandatory  regulation,  however,  most  of  the 
insurance contracts in Norway referred to it. The NMIP is a comprehensive document, which 
included inter alia provisions concerning hull insurance for ocean going ships and off shore 
units, however, the P&I insurance stays outside its scope. In the context of knock-for-knock 
agreements chapter 18 (regulating insurance for Mobile Offshore Units) of NMIP is highly 
relevant, as it contains some special rules concerning subrogation and co-insurance, relevant 
in our analysis. 
In the US, insurance was not considered "commerce" up until 1944, and ipso factum it 
was not subject to federal regulation. This situation was changed when in  United States v.  
South-Eastern  Underwriters  Association19,  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  Congress  could 
regulate insurance transactions that were truly interstate. The ruling held that the insurance 
industry could be regulated by federal law, rather than only state laws. The following year, 
however,  Congress  passed  the  McCarran-Ferguson  Act  (Public  Law  15),  overruling  the 
Supreme Court decision and prescribing that insurance regulation was a matter for the states 
and  not  the  Federal  government.  The  McCarran-Ferguson  Act  exempted  the  insurance 
industry from most Federal regulation, including anti-trust laws20. This Act, broadly speaking, 
gives  states  the  power  to  regulate  the  insurance  industry.  While  state  insurance  statutes 
override most federal laws, some portions of federal law (like federal tax laws) are always 
commanding. Therefore, when researching whether a particular law governs, a good rule is to 
ask whether the inquiry is related to the "business of insurance" (where state law governs), or 
whether it is related to peripherals of the industry (labour, tax law, securities – where federal 
law governs)21. 
2010 )
19 322 U.S. 533
20 United States v. The South-Eastern Underwriter Association,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/united-states-v-the-southeastern-underwriter-association.asp 
21 Legal Information Institute, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/insurance 
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4. Knock for knock – general characteristic
 Before the proper analysis of the knock-for-knock agreements, the short presentation 
concerning the offshore activity must be given since mutual hold harmless provisions are 
commonly used in this field.
4.1. Petroleum offshore sector – general presentation, parties of the 
offshore contracts
The oil and gas sector may be divided between an upstream and downstream aspect. In 
turn, the upstream oil and gas contracts can be subdivided into a number of different types, 
depending on the nature of the parties to the contract and the nature of the activities to be 
undertaken. The first category of agreements includes contracts between the operator of an oil 
and  gas  license  or  concession  (the  'Operator/Company')  –  normally  an  international  oil 
company or a national oil company, and a contractor that provides services to the operator 
(the  'Contractor')  in  relation  to  exploration  (such as  seismic  acquisition  or  drilling),  field 
appraisal  and  development  (appraisal  and  development  drilling,  production  and  offtake 
facilities construction) and field operation and production – 'services contracts' (well services, 
facilities hire and operations and maintenance). The second broad category of contracts is the 
Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) – a contract between the operator and its co-ventures or 
equity participants in the relevant licence, concession or area of cooperation22. The knock for 
knock clauses are commonly used in the upstream phase – mostly in the drilling contracts.
The mutual  hold  harmless  provisions  are  also commonly included in  the  standard 
charterparty for offshore service vessels like Supplytime 89 and its newer version Supplytime 
2005, where the liability is divided between the Owner and the Charterer.
4.2. Knock-for-knock clauses – content, 'liability zones' and concept 
of  'groups'
The contracting parties are generally free to establish their relations according to their 
will  if  the  contract  is  within  the  law.  In  every  case,  the  final  shape  of  the  contractual 
relationship will depend on the parties respective negotiating position in the changing market 
situation and circumstances concerning each similar project23.
Customary practice in the offshore drilling industry provides that the Contractor bears 
risk of personal injury or death of its personnel and generally assumes liability for rig and 
22 T. Hewitt, Who is to Blame? Allocating Liability in Upstream Project Contracts, 26 J. Energy Nat. 
Resources L. 177 2008, p. 179 – 180 
23 Toby Hewitt in his article presents the list of the losses where the allocation of risk is usually made, see: T. 
Hewitt, Who is to Blame? Allocating Liability in Upstream Project Contracts, 26 J. Energy Nat. Resources 
L. 177 2008, p. 180
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associated contractor equipment loss or damage (contractor`s zone). Conversely, the Operator 
normally  accepts  liability  for  its  own personnel  and  property and,  in  daywork  contracts, 
generally assumes responsibility for well related risks (including pollution, wild well control, 
well damage or loss) and reservoir damage (operator`s zone)24. Nevertheless, it must be noted 
that despite of fact that the contracting parties have a broad possibility to disclaim liability 
between each other, they do not have contractual freedom to regulate the tort position of an 
injured third party, since this kind of losses are regulated by tort law and the victim (third  
party) position against the party who caused the loss cannot be changed by contract in which 
the victim is not a part in25. This problem will be discussed below.
As was mentioned before,  the offshore activity marks  the involvement of multiple 
contractors and subcontractors. The indemnity regime has developed to deal with this problem 
and actually it is common for each party to indemnify the other not only against its own losses 
but also against those of members of its group, as defined in the contract. In the case of 
Contractor, the group would include persons who might be affected by an accident on the 
facility  but  who  do  not  have  a  contractual  relationship  with  the  Operator  or  with  other 
contractors  (this  group  might  include  the  contractor’s  employees,  affiliates,  agents  and 
subcontractors). In the case of the Operator/Company, its group would normally include the 
company’s  employees,  affiliates,  co-ventures  and  the  other  contractors  engaged  by  the 
company to provide services in relation to the relevant area of operations26. The contracting 
party, Operator or Contractor, then seeks back-to-back  indemnities from those other members 
of its group (other than employees) to ensure that the principle of absorbing one's own losses 
is  extended  down the  contractual  pyramid.  The  concept  of  'groups'  is  thus  based  on the 
understanding  that  the  relevant  party  hiring  such  services  might  negotiate  the  terms  of 
engagement and should thus require the subcontractor or the service company to contractually 
extend an indemnity for injury and death of its  own personnel.  This solution reduced the 
number of potential  “third parties” claims as most of them will  be included in the group 
definition. As a result, the number of cases, where the inquiry concerning the degree of fault  
would be necessary, is significantly reduced. A similar result is achieved in circumstances 
where  a  separate  “mutual  hold  harmless”  agreement  is  entered  into  between  the  drilling 
contractor and the various service companies and subcontractors involved in the operations. 
These “round robin” agreements generally apply the knock-for-knock approach and require 
each signatory to assume liability and hold the other signatories harmless for their respective 
24 C. A. Moomjian Jr, op.cit., p. 20
25 T.-L. Wilhelmsen,op.cit., p. 4
26 T. Hewitt, op.cit., p. 184
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personnel and property27. 
How  important  are  those  additional  agreements  indicates  the  example  below. 
According to the Norwegian law, the parties may agree to waive a claim for liability for 
damage to other person’s property or persons what will then constitute a promise not to make 
any claim against a third party. However, the parties may not in their contract enforce the 
other members of the respective groups to accept a similar regulation. It means that if similar 
regulation is not provided all  through the contractual chain,  a contractual party without a 
knock-for-knock regulation may refuse to accept responsibility for damage to his property and 
personnel and instead make a claim against the injurer28.
The scope of the particular 'groups' is often the subject of considerable disagreement 
with the larger oil companies in particular being reluctant to extend their indemnities to cover 
damage and injury caused to all of their contractors and their property. This reluctance reflects 
the  administration  required,  the  extent  of  the  risk  involved  in  obtaining  "back  to  back" 
indemnities  from these  contractors  and in  some cases  the  complexity of  field  ownership 
structures29.
4.3. Freedom of liability, indemnity and subrogation
The contracting parties are generally free to regulate the risk for causing damage to 
each other, hereunder limit liability for damage caused to the other party and waive the right 
to  claim damages from the other  party.  However,  the parties  to  the contract  do not  have 
contractual freedom to regulate the tort position of an injured third party, since this kind of 
losses are regulated by tort law and the victim (third party) position against the party who 
caused the loss cannot be changed by contract in which the victim is not a part in30. 
The extending scope of knock-for-knock provisions, including also the members of 
'parties` groups' (see above), reduced the number of potential “third parties” claims as most of 
them will  be  included  in  the  groups  definition.  To  extend  the  effect  of  knock-for-knock 
clauses to third parties outside the groups and all the employees, the indemnity must be used. 
Thus, if the Operator harms an employee E of the Contractor or cause damage to Es property, 
this damage shall according to the contract be compensated by the Contractor. However, E 
does not have to accept that the Contractor shall pay the claim. He may direct his claim to the 
Operator instead. If so, the knock-for-knock principle is obtained through a subrogated claim 
from the Operator against the Contractor after E is compensated. If E accepts compensation 
27 C. A. Moomjian Jr, op.cit., p. 21
28 T.-L. Wilhelmsen, op.cit., p. 10, See also H.J. Bull, op.cit., p. 341
29 C. D. Garrard, United Kingdom: The Hidden Dangers Of „knock-for-knock” Indemnities, 
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=83204 
30 T.-L. Wilhelmsen,op.cit., p. 4
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from the Contractor, the regulation further implies that the Contractor does not have a right to 
claim recourse from the Operator, even if the Operator is at fault31. The liability regulation in 
the knock-for-knock principle  is  therefore constructed partly as liability clauses,  partly as 
indemnity and recourse clauses32.
4.4. Insurance
As was written before, the offshore activity is very risky business where the potential 
losses  are  very high.  This  is  the  reason why the  insurance  must  be acquired  by each of 
contracting  parties.  Also,  the  understanding  underlying  the  allocation  of  liability  is  that 
insurance will be obtained by each party to cover the losses that that party might suffer – the 
knock-for-knock clauses are of no value if the Indemnitor has insufficient assets to back-up 
the Indemnity.
The contractual allocation of liability is not effective if the party (A) does not obtain 
speciﬁc rights under the other party’s (B) insurance – this means that A must be granted a 
protection against subrogation where he has caused damage to the B’s property covered by the 
insurance, as well as a right to claim the B’s insurance if A has had to cover liability for which 
the B was meant to be responsible. If the liability would be judged according to the general 
tort law, the insurer should have a right to regress against the tortfeasor, after having paid 
compensation  for  the  casualty.  In  such  case,  the  whole  idea  of  contractual  allocation  of 
liability  will  be  undermined.  This  is  why the  knock-for-knock  provisions  are  commonly 
accompanied with the clauses concerning waiving all insurer’s rights of subrogation against 
the tortfeasor or naming the other party as a co-insured.
As en example of the first possibility the section §18-9(1) of the Norwegian Marine 
Insurance Plan (NMIP) which considers a waiver of the insurer’s right of subrogation might 
be invoked. If the insurance contract is governed by the NMIP, the insurer does not have any 
right of subrogation against a person who has caused damage if such third party has been 
granted contractual protection against recourse, provided that such contractual regulation is 
regarded as customary in the activities in which the structure is involved. The NMIP does not 
express the scope of such waiver, however, according to the Commentary this right is not 
absolute – the limitation can be found in the background law (section 36 of the Norwegian 
Contracts Act).
The other possibility is more indirect as the operator or contractor who is a third party 
to the insurance contract is becoming a co-insured under the insurance. The main content of 
co-insurance is  that  a third party with owner interest,  security interest  or other  economic 
31 See: Ibidem, p. 12, see also H.J. Bull, op.cit., p. 347
32 T.-L. Wilhelmsen, op.cit., p. 5
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interest in the insured property is insured for this interest under an insurance effected by the 
“main owner” or “assured”33. What is the most important in the context of knock-for-knock 
agreement, it is that the co-insured has so called indirect liability protection. In Norway, this is 
not  regulated  directly  neither  in  the  NMIP nor  in  the  ICA,  but  it  is  presumed  in  the 
preparatory documents to the ICA that the co-insured as injurer will have the same protection 
as  the  assured  if  he  causes  damage  that  constitutes  an  insured  event  under  the  casualty 
insurance effected by the assured. This protection means that the co-insured has the same 
protection against the insurer as he would have has as assured being responsible for causing 
an insured event through a breach of the so called duties of due care34.  According to the 
NMIP,  if  the  insurance  is  explicitly  effected  for  the  benefit  of  a  named  third  party,  the 
insurance  also  covers  his  interests,  but  the  insurer  may  invoke  the  rules  relating  to 
identification in §§3-36 to 3-38 (§8-1). Moreover, §18-9 par. 2 NMIP states that the insurance 
is effected for the benefit of anyone who is contractually entitled to be co-insured under the 
insurance, provided that such contractual regulation is regarded as customary in the activities 
in which the structure is involved. The regulation is thus similar in wording to the provision 
concerning right of subrogation. 
It should be noted that sometimes the existence of additional insured provisions can 
undermine a reciprocal indemnity agreements35 - it happens particularly when indemnity and 
insurance requirements are in conflict. In Tullier v. Halliburton Geophysical Services (HGS), 
the court held that a party (McCall), who has entered into a contractual indemnity provision 
but who also names the indemnitor (here HGS) as an additional assured under its liability 
policies,  must  first  exhaust  the  insurance  it  agreed  to  obtain  before  seeking  contractual 
indemnity36. The judge referred to Ogea v. Loffland Brothers Co., where it was stated that the 
insurance  procurement  and  indemnity  provisions  of  a  drilling  contract  "must  be  read  in  
conjunction with each other in order to properly interpret the meaning of the contract."37 
In the US the liability insurance may be alternative to prohibited indemnity (f.e. in 
Louisiana) or limits of liability insurance policies may limit indemnities (f.e. In Texas). This 
issue will be discussed in chapter 6.
The structure of the knock-for-knock principle is thus a combination of freedom from 
liability/acceptance of not making a claim, a basis for recourse from the party having paid the 
claim according to tort law, and a bar to recourse from the party having paid the claim even if 
33 Ibidem, p. 14
34 T.-L. Wilhelmsen, op.cit., p. 14
35 Ch. L. Evans, op.cit., p. 230
36 81 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 1996)
37 Ogea v. Loffland Brothers Co., 622 F.2d 186 (5th Cir.1980), at 190 
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he was not liable according to ordinary tort law38.
 5. Advantages and disadvantages of knock-for-knock clauses
5.1. Advantages of knock-for-knock agreements
While it might seem inappropriate at first to protect the party guilty of negligence or 
wilful misconduct, a fundamental purpose of risk allocation, i.e. creation of clear demarcation 
line of liability,  cannot  be obtain in another way.  Despite  the fact that such allocation of 
liability, based not on the fault of liable party, but rather on who makes the claim, is contrary 
to  the  traditional  system,  such  agreements  may be  very beneficial  for  both  parties.  It  is 
confirmed  in  practice  by  popularity  and  worldwide  recognition  of  knock-for-knock 
provisions.  The  specific  benefits  enjoyed  by  the  parties  will  often  depend  on  the 
circumstances  of  the  particular  contract,  however,  some  common  advantages  may  be 
distinguished.
A. Reduced costs
As was  written  before,  the  offshore  business  characterizes  the  high  level  of  sum 
invested and related risks. The search for oil and gas, even without accidents, is expensive and 
the  costs  of  insurance  and  possible  litigation  are  significant.  By  using  the  mutual  hold 
harmless clauses, the allocation of liability becomes clear and simple matter of contract. If the 
system would be based on traditional regime, in the case of accident giving rise to losses, the 
lengthy and complex litigation to establish liability based on the general law principles will be 
necessary. Hereby by using an indemnity provisions the parties could safe their money, as the 
investigation into which party was at fault is not required any more. 
The reduction of costs has also another aspect. A knock-for-knock agreements allows 
one party to take over responsibility for both contracting parties, which enable to retain one 
lawyer to defend both of them. For instance,  if an employee of a contractor for Company A is 
injured as a result of an accident caused by both Company A and Company B, the third party 
contractor  employee would generally bring suit against both companies to determine liability. 
In maritime cases, where the employer is not protected by workers' compensation laws, suit is 
often filed  directly against both companies by their own employees. In either case, without a 
reciprocal agreement, both companies would have to hire their own attorneys and incur the 
cost  of  separate   defences.  However,  if  the  parties  had  in  place  a  reciprocal  indemnity 
38 Ibidem, p. 12
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agreement,  one  attorney  would  be  able  to  defend  both  parties39.  The  knock-for-knock 
agreements allow thus not only to decrease the need for litigation between the parties but also 
cut down the overall litigation costs. 
B. Certainty
Another benefit connected with knock-for-knock agreements is establishment of the 
clear level of certainty to both parties with regard to their liability exposure. In the absence of 
the reciprocal indemnity regime, each contractor would need to insure against  the risk of 
destroying the entire facility (and, in some cases, group of facilities) and the risk of injuring or 
killing all the people on it40. Even if the contractor were able to insure against such risks, the 
premium involved would most likely be prohibitively expensive for smaller contractors and 
would, in any event, be an inefficient use of financial resources – in this regard, the contractor  
would  be  likely  to  seek  to  pass  through  the  increased  cost  of  insurance  to  the  project’s 
operator41. 
Moreover,  without  risk  allocation,  each  party  must  purchase  liability  insurance  to 
cover  potential  liability  for  damages  during  the  project.  This  will  then  be an  addition  to  
casualty insurance covering damage to and loss of property and loss of income, and insurance 
covering personal damage and death of employees. In case of an accident this would easily 
result in double insurance, where for instance damage to and loss of property is both covered 
by the injured party’s casualty insurance, and by the injurer’s liability insurance42. 
The main purpose of a knock-for-knock regulation in the offshore contract is thus to 
beneﬁt from the insurance cover effected by the respective parties. Moreover, with each party 
taking responsibility for damage or loss to their own property the parties’ need for third party 
liability cover is reduced43.
C. Good business relations and safety
The indemnity regime allows parties to work together, as they can focus on building 
up their business relationship without worrying about the dispute if something goes wrong. 
When the contractual parties have not in advance agreed their scope of potential liability, the 
39 Ch. L. Evans, F. Lee Butler, Reciprocal Indemnification Agreements in the Oil Industry: The Good, The Bad 
And The Ugly, 77 Def. Counsel J. 226 2010, p. 227
40 The  mutual  hold  harmless  clauses  concern  often  the  allocation  of  liability  for  injury  of  death  of  the 
respective employees on each side;  in most jurisdiction, however,  in most jurisdictions the employer is 
already required by law to maintain insurance covering injury or death of its personnel; each side is thus 
prepared to assume such risk by using the knock-for-knock provisions; a more troublesome situation arises 
in the case of third party claim
41 T. Hewitt, p. 183
42 T.L. Wilhelmsen, op.cit., p.16
43 D.R. Syvertsen, Co-insurance of third parties and waiver of subrogation, Scandinavian Institute of Maritime 
Law Yearbook 2011 MarIus nr 414, p.118
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amicable  working  relationship  may  be  quickly  destroyed  when  an  accident  occurs.  The 
offshore business characterises long lasted relations between business partners, this is why the 
proper atmosphere of    dealing should be maintained. Trying to establish another party`s 
responsibility in the case of incident is far away from the close working relationship. By using 
the  knock-for-knock clauses  the  interested  parties  can  work  together  to  solve  the  existed 
problem rather, than make matters worse by blaming each other. 
Moreover,  establishing  the  scope of  liability in  advance  let  to  transparency in  the 
parties relationships, and to creation of a safer workplace for all employees. In this situation, 
both parties have an equal incentive to make the work place safe for all, because either party 
can  be  responsible  for  the  accident,  even  if  it  was  not  their  fault44.  Thus  if  something 
happened, and the mutual hold harmless clauses are in force, the parties may focus on their 
mutual defence and the channels of communication between the contracting parties remain 
open, making it easier for the defending party to obtain information regarding the accident 
from the other party and to provide a better defence for both45. Without mutual hold harmless 
indemnity clauses, each party would conduct their own investigations, duplicated everything 
and hold their cards close46. Moreover, if the parties` liability is properly diminished, they can 
work together  to institute  safety policies without  concern that  the party responsible  for  a 
particular safety policy will increase their relative responsibility for any potential liability that 
might arise if the safety policy they were responsible for is violated and someone is injured47.
The hold harmless indemnity allows thus not only reduce the overall costs of offshore 
investments, but also enable building of the amicable atmosphere between the contracting 
parties, which contribute also in the safety issues. However, the benefits of the knock-for-
knock clauses in the safety field may be achieved only when the both parties work together 
and trust each other.
5.2. Disadvantages of knock-for-knock agreements
The mutual hold harmless allocation of liability has multiple advantages, but does not 
solve all  existing  problems.  The main  arguments  against  the  knock-for-knock regime lies 
directly  in  their  nature.  Since  the  contracting  parties  agree  to  cover  losses  of  their  own 
personnel  and equipment  in  the  case of  accident,  they may be liable  even without  being 
slightly blame. The issue seems even more unfair when the indemnified party acted with gross 
44 Ch.L. Evans, op.cit., p. 228
45 Ibidem, p. 229
46 See example presented in: A. Thomas, Knock-for-knock helps safety, http://www.standard-
club.com/docs/mm24.pdf, p. 10 – 11 
47 Ch.L. Evans, op.cit., p. 229
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negligence  or  wilful  misconduct.  Such  constructions  may thus  force  parties  to  deal  with 
claims they may otherwise never be involved. This could generate additional costs and be 
time-consuming. This is the reason why sometimes parties try to include provisions restricting 
the knock-for-knock clauses. Such action may on the one hand reduce the possibility of claim, 
particularly when the other party is at fault. On the other hand, when the accident occurs, the 
additional investigation is required to determine the responsibility of each party, which both 
takes time and generate extra costs. Moreover, parties in such case have to insure the property 
and employees they might be responsible for, what will let to double-insurance. Hereby, the 
advantages of mutual hold harmless clauses are minimised. 
Furthermore,  it  is  often  argued  that  since  the  knock-for-knock  clauses  contains 
exclusions of liability even in the case of gross negligence or wilful misconduct of tortfeasor, 
the responsibility for safety issues are so reduced that it might led to accidents. It may be thus 
argued that if the indemnified party is not liable for his own action, he may use less care to 
avoid injury or loss, because he will not be responsible for his own fault. This argument is, 
however, balanced by the other incentives concerning safety issues, described above48. 
Summing up, even if the knock-for-knock clauses may seem unjust at the first sight, 
the benefits  described above will  most  often prevail  over  disadvantages.  This  is  thus  the 
reason why these formulas are so commonly used and worldwide recognised, especially in 
those areas where the huge capital sum is involved, i.e. in drilling and towage contracts. Even 
so, the main problem of their enforceability is still unsolved.
48 See also: T.L. Wilhelmsen, op.cit., p. 4-5
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6. The knock-for-knock clauses in the US
6.1. Introduction
The  Unites  States  have  been  involved  in  the  offshore  business  from  the  very 
beginning. Their dominant position is continued and there is no indication to change. Even the 
recent catastrophe – the Deepwather Horizon oil spill has not undermined their supremacy. 
The world consistently needs oil and gas and the availability of these reserves in the Gulf of 
Mexico and other US offshore waters is  crucial  for the global economy.  That is  why the 
analysis of knock-for-knock clauses under the US law is so important.
There are several issues which parties have to have in mind when operating in the US 
offshore waters. The main of them are:
1. the determination of applicable law,
2. the  “express negligence doctrine”, and
3. the enforceability of knock-for-knock clauses under anti-indemnity statutes.
These problems (with the necessary introduction to each of them) will be thus respectively 
analysed in the following sub-chapters.
6.2. The applicable law
The first problem, which the contracting parties have to deal with when the agreement 
is governed by the US law, is the determination of applicable law. This issue is very important 
in the context of indemnity provisions, because their enforceability depends to a great extent 
on the law which governs the contract.  This issue will  be analysed below, after the short 
introduction to the US law system will be given. 
The law system in the US originates from English common law system, but  both 
groups has developed their specific solutions, so many differences may be noticed today. The 
law  in  this  country  consists  of  many  levels  of  codified  and  uncodified  forms  of  law. 
Moreover, the US is a federal state, so the federal law and the law of each particular state 
must be distinguished. Graham Hughes presented the US law system in such words:  
“Each state has a large measure of sovereignty, subject to the national application of federal  
statutes and the requirements imposed nationally by the United States Constitution. Thus it  
has been inevitable that the common law has not developed in exactly the same way in  
different states. At one time or another a state may have a judiciary and a political climate  
that  is  relatively  liberal  or  relatively  conservative  when  compared with  the  majority  of  
states. The economical and social interest to which the judiciary must pay attention in a  
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state with a largely agricultural economy may be very different from those that obtain in a  
highly  industrialized  state  with  a  very  large  urban  population.  Thus,  although  a  single  
common law was originally exported from England to America, a number of factors has led  
to the development of different common law rules in different states, notably in such areas as  
torts and criminal law”49.
Since  the  various  principles  (depending  on  the  applicable  law)  may apply  to  the 
contract concerning activity on the US offshore waters,  making the mutual hold harmless 
provisions  enforceable  or  void,  the  determination  of  applicable  law is  the  first  thing  the 
contracting parties must  be aware of,  drafting their  contract.  Among the laws which may 
apply in particular case are:
1) general maritime law of the US (being the part of federal law),
2) the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), or 
3) state law. 
Which of them applies to the specific incident depends on the circumstances giving 
rise to the event causing the problem. Lack of one, consistent system, applied specifically to 
the offshore industry in the US waters (and, thereby, also to the knock-for-knock agreements) 
complicated  the  problem  of  validity  of  indemnity  provisions.  Such  difficulty  was 
acknowledged in  Walsh v.  Seagull  Energy Corp.50,  where the court  stated:  “Since the oil  
industry went offshore, the legal system has struggled to produce a body of injury law that is  
rational, fair, internally consistent, and acceptably productive of safety incentives. The result  
has been chaos.”  
Below  the  enforceability  of  knock-for-knock  clauses  under  different  law  will  be 
shortly presented, as well as some difficulties concerning the question of determination of 
governing law.
6.3. General maritime law
By and large, express reciprocal indemnity agreements will be enforced under general 
maritime law, even if they serve to protect a party from its own negligence if they are properly 
written and absent a statutory or judicial precedent to the contrary51. Under maritime law, a 
contract of indemnity must clearly and unequivocally show that the parties intended to afford 
protection to  an indemnitee against  the  consequences  of  his  own negligence;  this  federal 
49 G. Hughes, Fundamentals of American law, New York 1996, p. 13
50 836 F. Supp. 411, 412 (S.D. Tex. 1993)
51 The judicial rulings in towage cases are quite different – US courts hold that a clause in a towing contract  
purporting to release the tug from liability for the tug’s negligence is invalid and unenforceable. However,  
parties now invariably achieve a similar result by arranging for cross-insurance endorsements in which the 
tug  is  named  as  an  additional  insured  and  subrogation  is  waived.  See:  L.  Lambert,  Knock  -for-knock 
contracts are enforceable in the US, Standard Offshore Biulletin, October 2011, p. 10
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“express negligence” rule also applies where there is concurring negligence of the indemnitor 
and the indemnitee52. In Young v. Kilroy Oil Co. of Texas, Inc53., the court stated that federal 
law on indemnity provides that “[a] contractual provision should not be construed to permit  
an indemnitee to recover for his own negligence unless the court is firmly convinced that such  
an interpretation reflects the intentions of the parties. This principle... is accepted with virtual  
unanimity among American jurisdictions”54.
The knock-for-knock provisions are thus typically intended to apply regardless of fault 
– however, federal courts applying general maritime law feel that it is against public policy to 
be indemnified for gross negligence or wilful misconduct. There are several judgements that 
acknowledged such approach, but there is also an authority to the contrary.
In this context, there should be mentioned a decision issued in April 2011 by the US 
District  Court for the Southern District  of Texas in  Energy XXI, GOM, LLC v. New Tech  
Engineering55, which addressed the problem of whether an indemnity under a master service 
agreement  governed  by  US  maritime  law  would  be  enforceable  in  the  event  of  gross 
negligence.  In considering the issue, the opinion stated that there is more support for the 
position that,  under maritime law, an indemnification clause purporting to exempt a party 
from liability for its own gross negligence is invalid than for the position that such clauses are  
an  appropriate  means of  risk shifting.  Somewhat  to  the  chagrin  of  many in the  offshore 
industry, the decision concluded  “that the indemnity provision in this case, to the extent it  
encompasses claims for gross negligence, is unenforceable.”56 The Energy XXI decision is, 
however, of questionable precedential value since it was issued by lower court and focused on 
the wording of a specific indemnity provision.  On the other hand, a recent decision on a 
summary judgement motion in the Macondo litigation held that the pollution indemnity in the 
drilling contract, which was governed by US general maritime law, would be applicable even 
in the event of gross negligence57. However, according to the order from 31 January 2012, 
issued  in  relation  to  partial  summary  judgement  cross-motions  in  the  BP/Halliburton 
Macondo litigation, public policy would not permit indemnification in the case of fraud, given 
that fraud involves wilful misconduct exceeding gross negligence58.
It  must  be  therefore  noticed  that  there  are  two  contrary  decisions  concerning 
52 J. L. Yeates, Contract Risk Management – Use of Insurance, 
http://www.gordonarata.com/720DE/assets/files/lawarticles/LANIER6.pdf, p. 21
53 673 S.W.2d 236, 244 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1984)
54 See also: United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 211 (1970)
55 L.P., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41223 (US DC Southern District of Texas)
56 C. A. Moomjian Jr, op.cit., p. 8-9
57 Ibidem, p. 9
58 The court wass also mindful that “mere failure to perform contractual obligations as promised does not 
constitute fraud but is instead breach of contract.” see: In Re: Oil Spill By The Oil Rig“Deepwater Horizon” 
In The Gulf Of Mexico, On April 20, 2010, US DC Eastern District Of Louisiana, p. 5-6
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enforceability of knock-for-knock clauses in the case of gross negligence when the contract is 
governed by general maritime law – one issued by the US District Court for the Southern 
District  of Texas (Energy XXI)  and other issued by the US District  Court for the Eastern 
District of Louisiana in the Macondo litigation. We thus have two District Courts within the 
Fifth Circuit that are dynamically opposed in respect of their determination as to whether an 
oilfield indemnity that expresses an intent to be applicable in the event of gross negligence 
will be enforceable as a matter of public policy under US general maritime law. Moreover, the 
ruling in  the latter  case seemingly indicates  that  the Court  would  not  enforce  an  oilfield 
indemnity governed by US general maritime law in the event of wilful misconduct or other 
intentional wrongdoing59.
It must be noted that the federal maritime law will apply exclusively to the contracts 
which are maritime in nature – it is well established that maritime law applies only to those 
cases where the subject matter bears the type of significant relationship to traditional maritime 
activities  necessary to  invoke admiralty jurisdiction60.  In  ascertaining  whether  the  subject 
matter  of  the  controversy  is  maritime  in  nature,  the  court  must  look  to  the  contract  to 
determine  whether  it  has  sufficient  maritime  nexus  apart  from the  fact  that  the  situs  of 
performance is in navigable waters61. In the context of offshore activity, the example of the 
contract concerning transportation of employees to and from the platform may be invoked62.  
6.4. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
The  application  of  the  Outer  Continental  Shelf  Land  Act  (OCSLA)  is  the  other 
possibility the parties have to have in mind when operating on the US Continental Shelf. This 
act was enacted in 1953 to encourage exploration and development of oil and gas deposits,  
located in the submerged lands of the outer continental shelf (OCS). The OCSLA defines the 
OCS as all submerged lands lying outside of a line, three geographical miles distant from the 
coastline of each state.  The OCSLA was intended to define a body of law that would be 
applicable to the seabed, subsoil, and fixed structures, such as artificial island, drilling rigs 
and platforms located on the OCS, for the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing and 
59 C.A. Moomjian Jr, op.cit., p. 12
60 See: Hunt Oil, 754 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1985)
61 See: Hollier, 972 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1992)
62 See: Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986), where two 
platform workers were killed in a crash on the high seas of a helicopter which had been transporting them 
from the offshore drilling platform where they worked to their home base in Louisiana. The Supreme Court  
concluded that: „admiralty jurisdiction is appropriately invoked here under traditional principles because the  
accident occurred on the high seas and in furtherance of an activity bearing a significant relationship to a  
traditional maritime activity. Although the decedents were killed while riding in a helicopter and not a more  
traditional  maritime  conveyance,  that  helicopter  was  engaged  in  a  function  traditionally  performed  by 
waterborne vessels:  the ferrying of passengers from an “island,” albeit an artificial one, to the shore”.
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transporting resources therefrom63.
At its most basic, the OCSLA intended that federal law will apply to the OCS (but the 
federal law referred to, according to the US Supreme Court, is not maritime law64), that the 
law of the closest adjacent state will apply as surrogate federal law, and that the exclusive 
remedy  for  workers  injured  on  the  OCS  will  be  the  Longshore  and  Harbor  Workers` 
Compensation Act (LHWCA)65. Section 1333(a)(1) (2)(A) of OCSLA states explicitly that: 
“To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with this subchapter or with  
other Federal laws and regulations of the Secretary [...], the civil and criminal laws of each  
adjacent State, […] are hereby declared to be the law of the United States for that portion  
of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf,  and artificial islands and fixed  
structures erected thereon, which would be within the area of the State if its boundaries were 
extended seaward to the outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf”  ․
It is thus a gap-filling statute meant to apply federal law to fixed structures on the OCS 
that are not covered by either maritime law or state law. OCSLA incorporates therefore the 
law of the state adjacent to the platform as surrogate federal law – which means that this law 
should govern also the offshore contracts on the OCS. For Fifth Circuit practice, an OCSLA 
situs in the Gulf of Mexico will be located either offshore Louisiana or offshore Texas, so the 
law of those states will then apply66. It means that also the Anti-indemnity Statute of these 
states must be taken into consideration when the knock-for-knock provisions on OCS are 
discussed (it may result in the invalidation of the mutual hold harmless clauses – see sub-
chapters 6.5.B.II and C below). The courts, however, have restricted the application of state 
law to agreements that are view as “non-maritime” in nature. Parties to maritime contracts 
remain thus free to enforce to indemnify themselves even against their own negligence67. 
 Deciding, whether the OCSLA applies to the case at hand and what effect it can give 
in the context of indemnity provisions, can be very difficult, both for contracting parties and 
for the court. In the 2002 decision of Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., Inc.68, the United States 
63 J.M. Adams, K.K. Milhollin, Indemnity On The Outer Continental Shelf – A Practical Primer, 27 TUL. 
MAR. L.J. 43, 46 (2002), p. 46
64 The Supreme Court has stated  also that Congress viewed maritime law as inapposite to OCSLA structures, 
and admiralty jurisdiction as not extending to accidents in areas covered by OCSLA; see: Herb's Welding,  
Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 421-22, 1985 AMC 1700, 1705 (1985).
65 See J.M. Adams, op.cit., p. 52
66 Ibidem, p. 58-59
67 However, the problem how to determine whether the contract is “maritime” or “non-maritime” is not easily 
solved;  See:  Grand Isle  Shipyard,  Inc.  v.  Seacor Marine LLC, 589 F.3d  778 (5th Cir.  2009)  (en  banc) 
(holding that  the LOIA invalidated an indemnity provision in a  contract  providing for work on a fixed  
platform in the Gulf of Mexico because the contract was non-maritime) and  Hoda v. Rowan Companies,  
Inc., 419 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that an indemnity provision was valid in a contract governed by 
maritime law).
68 280 F.3d 492 (5th Cir.2002)
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Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, comprehensively examined the scope of the § 1333(a)(1) situs 
requirement and clarified to which locations the OCSLA applies. At the same time the court 
asked for en banc consideration to straighten out the state of the law considering indemnity 
clauses on the OCS stated: “I regret to say that our Circuit case law on "what is a vessel" and  
"what is a maritime contract" and what is "maritime employment" have taken on a Humpty-
Dumpty  approach-they  are  whatever  a  particular  panel  says  they  are.  That's  a  tragic  
circumstance because it destroys uniformity and predictability of the law; and the only ones  
who benefit from unpredictability and confusion are lawyers”.
Summing up, to make a determination whether the OCSLA even applies in a given 
case,  involves a Herculean task of sorting, sifting and applying various tests of situs, status, 
applicability of  maritime general  law or  another  state's  law,  various  state  anti-indemnity 
statutes,   LHWCA,  the  Jones  Act,  contractual  choice-of-law  provisions,  indemnity 
provisions, and insurance provisions69. The problem is even more important as OCSLA is a 
congressionally-mandated choice of law provision requiring that the substantive law of the 
adjacent state is to apply even in the presence of a choice of law provision in the contract to 
the contrary70.
6.5. The state law 
A. Introduction
In  the  offshore  business,  dominated  by  the  large  oil  companies,  the  financial 
responsibility  for  claims  connected  with  offshore  activity  may be  unfairly  shifted  to  the 
subcontractors or their insurance companies. The subcontractors, especially in a construction 
subcontracts,  are often forced to take over  the whole risk for worksite  accidents or other 
losses even if they are caused by fault or negligence of the main contractors or rig owners. 
To protect the sub-contractors from the unfair contract terms, some states decided thus 
to introduce obligatory anti-indemnity statutes, which affected the validity of knock-for-knock 
clauses in the case of gross negligence or wilful misconduct. Forty-one states have now some 
form of law which prohibits a construction contract that requires a subcontractor to indemnify 
another party for its negligence71. 
The most complex anti-indemnity acts were adopted in Texas and Louisiana (TEX. 
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN Section 127.00 1, and LA. REV. STAT. ANN Section 
69 J.M. Adams, op.cit., p. 46
70 See: Union Texas Petroleum v. PLT Engineering, 895 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 848 (1990)
71 But some of these states limit the application of the law, for example, only to public projects. The complete 
list of relevant legislation can be found in Anti-indemnity Statutes in the 50 States, published by Foundation 
of the American Subcontractors Association, Inc., http://www.keglerbrown.com/File%20Library/Practice
%20Areas/Construction%20Law/2009-anti-indemnity-manual.pdf
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9:2780). Those and similar anti-indemnity statutes might quite easily invalidate the indemnity 
clauses  included  in  the  offshore  contracts  (the  Louisiana  legislature  has  already declared 
certain indemnity agreements in oil and gas contracts void as against public policy in an effort 
to defend contractors and their employees from large oil companies that require contractors to 
provide indemnification in their master service contracts, even when the oil company is at 
fault72). It should be, however, noted that despite the fact that the aim of both acts is to protect 
the downstream contractors from being forced to accept one-sided contractual indemnities 
that  insulated an upstream party against  virtually all  risk73,  the Texas and Louisiana anti-
indemnity acts are markedly different: Texas allows contractual indemnities in contracts that 
are backed by insurance and meet certain statutory requirements; Louisiana's anti-indemnity 
act simply voids contractual indemnities outright. These fundamentally different regulatory 
approaches to the same policy aim demonstrate what is at stake when a court or arbitration 
panel must decide whether to apply Texas or Louisiana law to a master service agreement that 
may cover dozens or hundreds of projects in multiple jurisdictions74. 
  In the further part of this chapter, the focus will be put on the specific solutions 
introduced in Louisiana and Texas, as the offshore business is the most developed there, and 
their anti-indemnity statutes have large impact to the drilling contracts on the US waters and 
outher continental shelf.
B. Texas
Texas has been the centre of offshore industry in the US from the very beginning. 
Initially the oil production focused onshore, but gradually also the offshore part has become 
the significant field of the Texas industry. This is then not surprised that several novel issues 
regarding  mutual  hold  harmless  provisions  have  been  recently  addressed  by  the  Texas 
Supreme Court, bringing some clarity and some additional problems at the same time. 
When  the  contract  is  governed  by  Texas  law,  the  indemnity  provisions  to  be 
enforceable must be consistent with the “express negligence doctrine” and the Texas Oilfield 
Anti-Indemnity  Act.  These  two  issues  will  be  thus  discussed  below  in  the  following 
subchapters.
I. The express negligence doctrine
It is well established in the Texas legal system that a contract for indemnity is read as 
72 Ch. L. Evans, op.cit., p. 230
73 See: Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 127.001-127.008; La Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2780. 
74 E. Cassidy, The Three-Legged Stool: A Practical Approach to Negotiating Choice of Law Provisions by 
Reference to Anti-Injunction Statutes in Texas and Louisiana, The Energy Law Advisor, 
http://www.cailaw.org/iel_advisor/industry_news/antiinjunction.html#_ftnref1 
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any other contract to ascertain the intent of the parties75. Under principles of contract law, 
courts must thus ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in the 
agreement.  However,  the  benchmark  of  the  Texas  law  concerning  mutual  hold  harmless 
provisions are the “express negligence doctrine” and “fair notice requirements”. These rules 
were adopted by Texas Supreme Court in 1987 in Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Const. Co.76, where it was 
decided that for an indemnification provision to be legally enforceable under Texas law, it needs 
to be written explicitly in contract. The underlying concept is that, if a party is to provide 
indemnification  for  the  consequences  of  another  party’s  negligence  acts,  the  indemnity 
provisions should be obvious, be clearly expressed and state the intent to cover various forms 
of negligence. In adopting this rule of law, the Supreme Court explained:
„The express negligence doctrine provides the parties seeking to indemnify the indemnitee  
from the consequences of its  own negligence must  express that  intent in specific terms.  
Under the doctrine of express negligence, the intent of the parties must be specifically stated  
within the four corners of the contract”.
Such rule was further acknowledged in  Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum,  
Inc.77, where the Supreme Court held that the threshold inquiry when reviewing a contractual 
provision that requires the indemnitee to be protected from its own negligence centres upon 
the  "fair  notice  requirements  of  conspicuousness."  Conspicuousness,  mandates  “that  
something must appear on the face of the [contract] to attract the attention of a reasonable  
person when he looks at it78”.
As a result of these decisions, contracts in offshore business governed by Texas law 
broadly  provide  express  notice  of  the  risk  allocation  provisions  at  the  beginning  of  the 
contract, include liability and indemnity clauses in attention-getting text (often by using bold 
capital letters or different colours) and clearly expressing the unequivocal intention to provide 
indemnity even so various types of negligence or other bases of legal liability. The contracting 
parties,  to  make  the  indemnity  provisions  enforceable,  include  specific  formula  in  the 
contract, sometimes called “magic words” or “talismanic language”. The statements similar to 
the following should be sufficient to express intention of the parties and enforce the indemnity 
provisions:
75 See: Ohio Oil Co. v. Smith,365 S.W.2d 621, 627 (Tex.1963); Spence & Howe Construction Co. v. Gulf Oil 
Corporation, 365 S.W.2d 631, 637 (Tex.1963); Liberty Steel Co. v. Guardian Title Co.,713 S.W.2d 358, 360 
(Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, no writ), SAFECO INS. CO. OF AMERICA. v. GAUBERT 829 S.W.2d 274 (1992)
76 725 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. 1987)
77 853 S.W.2d 505, 511 (Tex. 1993); see also:  The decision in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Petroleum Personnel 
Inc, 768 S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tex. 1989)
78 B. Frost, Indemnified or Not?, The Permian Basin Petroleum Association Magazine, 15 March 2012, 
http://pbog.zacpubs.com/?p=383
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 “It is the intent of the parties hereto that, where responsibility or liability is assumed by  
either party or where either of the parties agrees to release or indemnify the other party in  
respect of any claim, demand or cause of action, unless it otherwise is expressly stated, such  
release, assumption of liability and/or indemnification shall apply notwithstanding the gross,  
sole, concurrent, active or passive negligence of any party hereto or any person, firm, or  
corporation for which such party is responsible (whether or not such negligence related to a  
pre-existing condition or defect), any breach of warranty or representation, unseaworthiness  
of any rig or vessel owned or hired by either party, or any other legal theory (including tort,  
strict or product liability) which otherwise may be applicable.79”
In the other words, the express negligence doctrine provides that parties seeking to 
indemnify the indemnitee from the consequences of its own negligence must express that 
intent  in  specific  terms.  There  is,  however,  one  exception  to  this  "conspicuousness 
requirement" - if the language is in an extremely short document, then it could be considered 
conspicuous  provided  that  the  indemnitor  could  prove  that  the  indemnitee  had  actual 
knowledge of the contents of the indemnity provision. The court in the Page and Dresser case 
did not elaborate on how short a document must be to constitute an extremely short document, 
but did give the example of a telegram being a good illustration80. 
II. The Texas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Statute
The express negligence doctrine is not the only condition which the contracting parties 
must meet to enforce the indemnity provisions. In order to have a knock-for-knock agreement 
upheld,  the  companies  in  offshore  industry must  adhere  also  to  the  Texas  Oilfield  Anti-
Indemnity Statute.  The Act  was introduced in  1973 and its  aim was to  prevent  large  oil 
owners and oilfield operators from demanding their contractors to indemnify them not only 
against negligence on the part of the contractor,  but also any possible negligence of third 
parties, including their own. Such practice was judged to be not only unfair, but was seen to 
be placing severe strain on the contractors’ bottom-line81. In effort to combat this activity, the 
Texas legislature passed the Texas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Statute.  § 127.003 of the Statute 
provides that:
“(a)  Except  as  otherwise  provided  by  this  chapter,  a  covenant,  promise,  agreement,  or  
79 C. A. Moomjian Jr, Contractual insurance and risk allocation in the offshore drilling industry (3/3), Drilling 
Contractor, May/June 1999, p. 26
80 P. S. Murphy, The Contract You Thought You Made: The Express Negligence Doctrine, 
http://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/the-contract-you-thought-you-made-the-express-
negligence.html; See also: Coastal Transport Company v. Crown Central Petroleum Corporation, et al, 20 
S.W.3rd 119 (Tex. App. Â– Houston [14th District] 2000)  
81 Asdza Nadleehe, The Texas Anti-Indemnity Law – what does it mean for your business?, 
http://www.oilandgasiq.com/legal-and-regulatory/articles/the-texas-anti-indemnity-law-what-does-it-mean-
for/
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understanding contained in, collateral to, or affecting an agreement pertaining to a well for  
oil, gas, or water or to a mine for a mineral is void  if it purports to indemnify a person  
against loss or liability for damage that:
(1)  is caused by or results from the sole or concurrent negligence of the indemnitee, his  
agent or employee, or an individual contractor directly responsible to the indemnitee;  and
(2) arises from:
(A) personal injury or death;
(B) property injury;  or
(C) any other loss, damage, or expense that arises from personal injury, death, or property  
injury”.
The scope of the act is thus restricted only to those agreements for services which 
pertaining to a well  for oil,  gas,  or water or to a mine for a mineral  (those services 
include,  however,  a  broad range of  activities;  see:  Section  127.003).  The Texas  Supreme 
Court has not defined the requirements of "well or mine services," but the Texas Courts of 
Appeal have, and they require a close nexus between the indemnity agreement and the "well 
or mine services." For example, in Transworld Drilling Co. v. Levingston Shipbuilding Co.82, 
the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that the Texas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Statute did not 
apply to an agreement to repair an offshore drilling rig when the contractor performed the 
repairs in a shipyard. 
Nevertheless, if the indemnity agreement concerns services dealing with wells or a 
mineral mine does not purport to indemnify a party against that party's own negligence, then 
the indemnity agreement is not covered by the Statute – but, ipso factum, it means that if  
contract does apply to those services, then even if contracting parties comply with the fair 
notice doctrine and the express negligence doctrine, the clause in which they attempt to be 
relieved from the effects of their own negligence still will not be enforceable due to the Texas 
Anti-Indemnity Act83. It should be noted that the Texas Anti-Indemnity Act does not cover 
fixed facilities, purchasing, gathering, selling, or transporting of production, Joint Operating 
Agreements,  or confidentiality agreements,  since all are not agreements for services to be 
performed on a well or mineral mine (initially it did not apply to pipelines as well, but it has  
changed to the some extent since June 2011 – when the act has been amended – HB 2093)84.  
It must be stressed that the act contains, however, very important exception limiting its 
scope – it does not apply to an agreement that provides for indemnity if the parties agree in 
82 693  S.W2d 19, 23 (Tex. Ct. App. 985)
83 P. S. Murphy, op.cit.
84 Also Section 127.004 contains also several exclusions, f.e. personal injury, death, or property injury that 
results from radioactivity.
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writing that the indemnity obligation will be supported by liability insurance coverage to be 
furnished by the indemnitor subject to the following limitations: 
• With respect to a mutual indemnity obligation, the indemnity obligation is limited to 
the extent of the coverage and dollar limits of insurance or qualified self-insurance 
each party as indemnitor has agreed to obtain for the benefit of the other party as 
indemnitee.
• With respect to a unilateral indemnity obligation, the amount of insurance required 
may not exceed $500,00085.
A "mutual indemnity obligation" means an agreement in which the parties agree to 
indemnify  each  other,  for  loss,  liability  or  damage  arising  from  claims  of  their  own 
employees,   contractors  and  invitees  arising  out  of  performance  of  the  agreement86.  A 
"unilateral  indemnity  obligation"  means  an  agreement  in  which  one  of  the  parties  as 
indemnitor,  agrees to  indemnify the other  party as  indemnitee for  claims,  but  there is  no 
reciprocal indemnity obligation87.
Exception from sec. 127.005 is the main difference between the Texas and Louisiana 
Anti-Indemnity  Statutes,  as  the  Texas  Act  makes  contractual  indemnities  valid  and 
enforceable if they are supported by insurance and meet basic statutory requirements. Parties 
to a contract may thus negotiate mutual hold harmless clauses, but only if these clauses are 
backed by insurance.  Mutual  indemnity is  allowed when insurance  is  purchased „for  the 
benefit of the other party as indemnitee”. 
The Texas Act’s allowance of insurance coverage when there are mutual indemnity 
obligations  has  led  to  litigation  in  those  circumstances  where  each  party  to  the  oilfield 
contract provides different levels and/or types of coverage to the other. Generally, where this 
circumstance exists, the party,  or its insurer – from which indemnity is being sought, has 
argued that since the indemnity obligation is not mutual in every respect, the entire indemnity 
obligation and its insurance coverage are void. However, the Texas courts have rejected this 
argument and instead held that the lowest common denominator of insurance coverage, in 
terms of the dollar amount of insurance coverage and the type of coverage, provided by the 
parties to each other is the maximum amount and type of indemnity permitted under the Texas 
Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act88. The parties, however, do not have to purchase insurance for the 
same amount  of  coverage  –  but  if  one  party has  more  limited  coverage,  any contractual 
85 Sec. 127.005
86 Sec. 127.001(3)
87 Sec. 127.001(6)
88 R. Redfearn, Jr.,Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Acts and Their Impact on Insurance Coverage: A Comparative 
Analysis, Insurance Journal West Magazine, 22 August 2005, 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/features/2005/08/22/59608.html
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indemnity obligation is limited to the amount of coverage held by the party with the least 
insurance. This means that contracting parties may negotiate mutual indemnification only to 
the extent that it is truly mutual, and no more89. 
C. Louisiana
Under Louisiana’s general law of indemnity, a less stringent test than Texas’s express 
negligence  rule  is  used.  Louisiana  law  follows  the  general  rule  that  a  party  may  be 
indemnified  against  its  own negligence  if  the  indemnification  is  clearly expressed  in  the 
parties' contract90. An indemnity provision will be strictly construed, but neither an express 
reference to “negligence” nor the use of any “magic words” in such agreement is required – 
rather the inquiry focuses on the intent of the parties, as inferred from the language of the 
agreement91.  The  Louisiana  Oilfield  Anti-Indemnity  Act  introduces,  however,  important 
exception to this rule, based on a public policy principle. 
The Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act (LOIA) was enacted in 1981, upon finding 
that "an inequity is foisted upon certain contractors and their employees by the defense or  
indemnity provisions [...] contained in some agreements pertaining to wells for oil, gas, or  
water or drilling for minerals”92. This point of view was acknowledged by the Supreme Court 
of Louisiana in Fontenot v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,  where it has been observed that the LOIA 
“arose  out  of  a  concern  about  the  unequal  bargaining  power  of  oil  companies  and  
contractors  and was an attempt  to  avoid  adhesionary  contracts  under  which  contractors  
would have no choice but to agree to indemnify the oil company, lest they risk losing the  
contract”93.
 The LOIA limits the enforceability of knock-for-knock clauses by declaring that any 
"provision contained in, collateral to, or affecting an agreement pertaining to a well for oil,  
gas, or water . . . is void and unenforceable to the extent that it purports to or does provide  
for defense or indemnify, or either, to the indemnitee  against loss or liability for damages  
arising out of or resulting from death or bodily injury to persons, which is caused by or  
results from the sole or concurrent negligence or fault (strict liability) of the indemnitee, or  
an  agent,  employee,  or  an  independent  contractor  who  is  directly  responsible  to  the  
indemnitee.94"  The  agreement  in  this  context  means  any  agreement  “concerning  any 
operation related to the exploration, development, production, or transportation” of oil, gas 
89 See also: J.M. Adams, p. 82-88
90 See: Rodrigue v. Legros, 563 So. 2d 248, 254 (La. 1990) 
91 J. Lanier Yeates, op.cit., p.4 
92 J. Garner, The Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act, https://www.hightable.com/legal-issues/insight/the-
louisiana-oilfield-indemnity-act-49810 
93 Fontenot v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 676 So.2d 557, 563 (La.1996). 
94 Section 2780(B)
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or minerals95. 
It must be stressed that the Louisiana Act does apply only to cases for personal injury 
or death, does not, however, include damage to property or economic loss. In contrast to the 
Louisiana   Act,  the  Texas  Anti-Indemnity  Statute  applies  also  to  the  property  damage. 
Moreover, the Louisiana Oilfield Act does not allow reciprocal indemnification provisions 
when they concern death or bodily injury, even when these obligations are mutual and based 
on the satisfactory insurance. The scope of the statutes is, however, not entirely clear and this 
issue  was  several  times a  subject  of  litigation,  as  the  statutory language leaves  open the 
question  of  whether  any specific  indemnity agreement  is  “collateral  to” or  “affects” an 
agreement which “pertains to” a well or the drilling for minerals96.  The Fifth Circuit studied 
the history and intent of the Texas Statute, and concluded that it differs substantially from the 
Louisiana  Oilfield  Indemnity  Act  (LOIA),  in  that  the  Texas  Statute  defines  agreements 
"pertaining to a well" as requiring the contractor to render "well or mine services”. The LOIA, 
on the other hand, states that any agreement concerning oil and gas operations is an agreement 
"pertaining to a well". Generally speaking, the courts in Texas, Louisiana, New Mexico and 
Wyoming do not apply their Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Acts to agreements for general oilfield 
work, but only to those agreements which have a not too attenuated relation to the operation, 
maintenance or repair of a distinct oil, gas or other mineral well or wells 97.
Simultaneously,  The LOIA also invalidates contractual clauses requiring waivers of 
subrogation,  additional  named  insured  endorsements,  or  "any  other  form  of  insurance  
protection" that would frustrate the intent of the LOIA (Section 2780(G)). In  Babineaux v  
McBroom Rig  Building  Services,  Inc.98,  the  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Fifth 
Circuit held that this section of the LOIA means that all additional insured provisions required 
by contract are unenforceable. However, in  Fontenot v Chevron USA., Inc.99, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court held that this did not extend to a waiver of subrogation clause in an indemnity 
contract, as long as the waiver did not frustrate or circumvent the LOIA. The court in the 
latter case held that a waiver of subrogation is invalid only when it shifts liability in favour of 
the oil company, and that occurs only when it is used in conjunction with an indemnification 
clause.  The  court  noted  that  since  the  plaintiff  had  not  attempted  to  enforce  the 
indemnification provision, no shifting of liability had occurred. However, it must be noted 
that the judgement was issued after analysing the very specific facts of the case, so it should 
95 Section 2780 (C)
96 This problem has been analysed by the US courts, f.e. in Oliver Broussard v. Conoco, Inc. v. SHRM 
Catering, Inc., 959 F.2d 42 (1993 A.M.C. 2404).
97 R. Redfearn, Jr., op.cit.
98 806 E2d 1282 (5th  Cir. 1987)
99 676 So. 2d 557 (La. 1996)
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not have a precedential value.
The rule of Section 2780 (G) is also restricted in another aspect, since the courts have 
created a judicial exception to the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act in the case of co-
insurance  by  permitting  indemnity  when  the  party  being  indemnified  pays  for  the 
indemnitor`s  insurance  coverage.  In  Marcel  v.  Placid  Oil  Co.100,, the  United  States  Fifth 
Circuit  Court of Appeals considered an oilfield contract in which the plaintiff’s employer 
(indemnitor) was required to provide insurance coverage to the defendant (indemnitee), who 
agreed to compensate the employer for the cost of the insurance premiums necessary to add it 
as a co-insured. On the other words, the additional insured (indemnitee) paid here for its own 
insurance coverage. The court upheld such an arrangement and found that it was not contrary 
to  the  LOIA.  It  noted  that  the  LOIA was  concerned  with  preventing  the  shifting  of  the 
economic burden to the contractor, a concern that was not present where the indemnitee bore 
the costs of the additional insurance coverage and no material part of the cost of insurance is 
borne by the party procuring the coverage. Thus, the indemnitee is receiving the benefit of the 
contractual  insurance  he  purchased,  rather  than  indemnity,  which  is  prohibited  by  the 
statute101. This exception is known now as the "Marcel exception”. However, if a material part 
of the cost of insuring the indemnitee is borne by the independent contractor, the exception 
does not apply102. The Marcel doctrine is often reflected in drilling contracts governed by the 
Louisiana law so as to render knock-for-knock contractual indemnities addressing personal 
injury and death enforceable103. The sample language attempting to comply with the Marcel 
exception may be following: 
• applicability of the Louisiana law:  “Notwithstanding anything contained herein to  
the contrary in this Exhibit “B” or the Master Service Agreement attached hereto, to  
the  extent  that  particular  Work  performed  hereunder  is  non-maritime  and  is  
performed  in  the  State  of  Louisiana  or  offshore  of  the  State  of  Louisiana,  and  
maritime law is held inapplicable,..
• consideration-premium payment: ..Contractor agrees that, in return for payment of  
the applicable premium by Company..
• sharing of contractor’s policy coverage: ..all of Contractor’s insurance policies (with  
the exception of Workers Compensation coverages and applicable minimum limits  
required in this Master Service Agreement) shall, to the extent that Contractor has  
expressly  assumed  the  risks  allocated  to  it  under  the  attached  Master  Service  
100 11 F. 3d 563 (5th Cir. 1994) 
101 James Garner, op.cit.
102 See: Amoco v. Lexington Ins. Co., 745 So.2d 676 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1999), where Amoco paid $2 000 to get 
coverage of $11 000 000
103 C. A. Moomjian Jr, Drilling Contract Historical Development..., op.cit., p. 6
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Agreement..
• extends protected groups: ..name Company Group (as herein defined) as additional  
insureds thereunder, provide a waiver of subrogation in favor of Company Group,  
and be primary as respects any other coverage in favor of Company Group..
• payment of premium: ..Contractor shall bill Company for all premiums incurred in  
obtaining  additional  Insured  coverage,  waivers  of  subrogation,  and  primary  
endorsements  as  described  above  for  Company  Group  (as  herein  defined).  Both  
parties  agree  that  Company  is  paying  for  all  material  parts  of  the  insurance  
protection for Company Group (as herein defined).104” 
As we can see, some specific problems concerning applicability of the Louisiana Anti-
Indemnity Statute may easily appear between the parties in the offshore industry. That is why 
the careful and precision drafting is highly required. Since the Louisiana law will probably 
apply to the Deepwather Horizon case, the thoughtful observation of mutual impact is advised 
as the final result can change the scope and meaning of indemnity clauses included nowadays 
in offshore contracts.
6.6. The knock-for-knock under the US law – summary
Summing up, the rulings in litigation involving general US admiralty and maritime 
law have established enforceability of traditional knock-for-knock clauses even in the event of 
negligence or other culpability. In the Rodrigue v. Legros105 the court stated that: “By allowing 
indemnity  provisions  to  be  fully  enforceable,  the  federal  maritime  law  gives  parties  the  
contractual freedom to allocate risks between themselves”. The condition, however, is that 
such  provisions  must  be  specific  and  conspicuous,  so  the  doubts  will  be  judged  contra 
proferentem. On the other hand, the problem might be much more complicated in those states 
where anti-indemnity statutes were introduced, but as was presented above, those statutes 
have often limited scope of applicability and, as practice shows, the offshore business tries to 
deal successfully with difficulties they may cause.
104 Beirne, Maynard & Parsons, L.L.P, Indemnity and Insurance: Considerations in negotiating, drafting and 
enforcing,  http://www.acc.com/chapters/houst/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=1256869, p. 
42-47
105 563 So. 2D 248, 255 (la. 1990)
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7. The knock-for-knock clauses in Norway
7.1. Introduction
When the offshore contract is governed by Norwegian law the main problem concerns 
the enforceability of knock-for-knock clauses in the case of gross negligence of one party – 
this  issue  will  be  thus  discussed  in  detail  below.  It  should  be  noted  here  that  it  is  well 
established in Norwegian legal tradition that the clauses disclaiming liability for party’s own 
fraudulent or intentional breach of contract should not be upheld106.
Parties  operating  under  Norwegian  law are  generally free  to  design their  relations 
according to their will. Moreover, the main rule is that contracts shall be fulfilled as agreed107. 
The contractual party is therefore free to limit his liability against other party, and waive his 
right to claim any liability in tort from this party108. Furthermore, parties are also free to waive 
their right to claim any liability from a third party, and thus waive such right in regard to the  
whole group109. It means that also knock-for-knock provisions will be broadly enforced if they 
are in accordance with the general contract law. Nevertheless, the freedom of contract is not 
unlimited  –  there  can  be  found several  restrictions  of  this  principle,  even  in  commercial 
contracts. Due to the similarities between indemnity clauses and exclusion clauses, many of 
the same scruples and considerations apply to both contractual provisions – this means that, in 
Norwegian law, indemnity clauses are likely to be treated the same way as exclusion clauses 
in relation to the mandatory rules110. 
To decide whether the knock-for-knock clauses will be enforceable under Norwegian 
law, the general contract law must be considered. The analysis below will thus be based on 
two statutes:
1. NL 5-1-2111
2. The Norwegian Contracts Act (section 36)112
It  can  be  said  that  despite  of  common  application  of  knock-for-knock  clauses  in 
contracts governed by Norwegian law113, there are still several problems which are constantly 
106 See f.e. O. Lund, Standardkontrakter, bilsalg og preseptoriske regler, Lov og Rett 1964, I. Hole, 
Ansvarsfraskrivelse i massekontrakter, Norsk Forsikringsjuridisk Forenings Publikasjoner nr. 40
107 Kong Cristian Den Femtis Norske Lov av 25. april 1687 (NL) 5-1-1.
108 Bull, op.cit., p. 346
109 T.-L. Wilhelmsen, op.cit., p. 11
110 A. Bjerketveit, Indemnity- and Hold Harmless Clauses..., p. 26
111 Kong Christian Den Femtis Norske Lov av 15. april 1687 5-1-2.
112 Lov 31. mai 1918 nr 4 om avslutning av avtaler, om fuldmagt og om ugyldige viljeserklæringer 
(avtaleloven).
113 See f.e. the Norwegian Fabrication Contract 2007 (NF 07) and the Norwegian Total Contract 2007 (NTK 
07), where the indemnity provisions applies „regardless of any form of liability, whether strict or by 
negligence, in whatever form, on the part of the other group.”
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discussed in legal theory. Below, the reciprocal indemnity provision will be thus discussed in 
the context of general contract law, with the special focus on a gross negligence problem.  
7.2. NL 5-1-2
As  was  written  before,  the  freedom of  contract  is  one  of  the  main  principles  in 
Norwegian law, however,  there are several exceptions which restricted this rule. The very 
general one may be already found in the act from 1687 – Kong Christian Den Femtis Norske 
Lov. The regulation is very simple as this statute forbids those agreements which are against  
law  and  morality  (“imod  Loven,  eller  Ærbarhed”).  Even  if  the  wording  is  simple,  the 
problem,  however,  remains  with  a  definition  of  the  term 'morality' and  as  such must  be 
interpreted by court in each particular case. It should be stressed that in this context the judges 
must refer to 'the general social morality' (generally accepted moral rules) and cannot based 
their judgement on their own perception of ethic. Since the conceptualization of morality is 
continually changing and it depends on place and time, the quotation of old cases should be 
done with caution114.
The restriction derived from NL 5-1-2 is the most essential in the context of gross 
negligence since such exclusions may seem to be against morality. Hagstrøm points out that 
the responsibility for gross negligence can be compared with the non-statutory strict liability 
and that there is very strong constraints on where the responsibility should be placed when the 
party was found to be grossly negligent115.  There can also be found some case law which 
approved such point of view – in Rt. 1916 p. 717 the court held that: “The party’s guilt can be  
so obvious or gross that his waiver of liability should not be approved”. The definition of 
gross  negligence  is  well  established  both  in  Norwegian  case  law and  legal  theory –  the 
Norwegian Supreme Court in one of their judgements stated that ”In order for an act to be  
considered as grossly negligent, it  must in my opinion represent a pronounced derogation  
from common proper behaviour. It must be a behaviour that is strongly blameable, where the  
person is substantially more to blame than where an act is only negligent.116” 
How to interpret the term “party’s guilt” is the question about identification. We can 
thus differ between the company’s own fault and the fault of its ordinary employees. In the 
case where one or both of the parties are legal persons (companies), the acts of the company’s 
management will be identified with the company itself.  It  should be, however, added that 
courts are rather willing to exclude broad range of workers from a “company’s management”.  
In  Rt.  1994 p.626 the  dispute  concerned whether  the  freight  forwarder  could  invoke  the 
114 See: V. Hagstrøm, Om grensene for ansvarsfraskrivelse, særlig i næringsforhold, Tidskrift for Rettsvesen 
1996, p. 475
115 V. Hagstrøm, op.cit., p. 473
116 M, Murray & Spens LLP and Thommessen AS, op.cit., p. 27
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limitation of liability in the shipping contract, despite docked inspector gross negligence. The 
Supreme Court  ruled  that  the  inspector  should  not  be  considered  a  part  of  the  shipping 
company's management, and that he could not be identified with management even if he had 
made autonomous decisions in connection with the incident. 
The courts and legal theory thus broadly accepted disclaimers of liability which covers 
actions taken by employees outside company’s management, as being in accordance with NL 
5-1-2, even if such accident is caused deliberately or with gross negligence. Lund justifies 
such a  view writing  that  in  practice  it  may be totally impossible  to  monitor  whether  the 
employee  acted with  intent  or  gross  negligence  and since  they can  inflict  their  employer 
significant damage, such liability could also be "extremely inconsistent and burdensome.117" 
The less certain issue is to what extent freedom of liability for gross negligence or deliberate 
act of the company itself may be valid. 
The  Norwegian  Supreme  Court  several  times  have  stated  that  indemnity  clauses 
disclaiming liability where one party was at fault (gross negligence, intent) are not valid as 
being contrary to NL 5-1-2118 Based on these judgements, it is claimed in legal theory that 
limitation of liability for the company’s own gross negligence is invalid as an absolute rule. 
Hagstrøm  argues  that  NL  5-1-2  provides  an  absolute  bar  to  indemnification  for  gross 
negligence and intent from the party himself, and that this is important as a background for 
interpretation of Contract Act § 36119. Nevertheless, this view is questioned nowadays – in the 
preparatory documents to the Contract Act § 36, it was claimed that the interpretation of NL 
5-1-2 is uncertain in regard to limitation of liability120. It was also argued that invalidity is 
merely a main rule where there is room for exceptions depending on the circumstances121. 
When assessing the knock-for-knock clauses in the context of morality the reasoning behind 
such clauses and the advantages of their application must be remembered (see: chapter 5.1). 
Therefore, it is difficult to see why morality should prevent an efficient development of risk 
sharing.  Even so,  the conception is  still  unclear  as there is  no Supreme Court  judgement 
concerning this issue.
It  should be stressed that not all  indemnity clauses concerning the companies own 
fault  would  not  be  enforceable  under  Norwegian  law  –  the  courts  to  some  extent  have 
accepted the knock-for-knock provisions if they concerned ordinary negligence of company’s 
management, however, their enforceability were rather suspended in the case of more serious 
carelessness.
117 O. Lund, op.cit., p. 68
118 See f.e. Rt 1916 p. 717 and Rt 1926 p. 712
119 V. Hagstrøm, op.cit., p. 464 and 475
120 Ot prp 1979:32 p. 19
121 T.-L. Wilhelmsen, op.cit., p. 22-23
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The  detailed  demarcation  between  management’s  and  employee’s  fault  is  not  so 
significant today, since the Norwegian Contracts Act in section 36 introduces different criteria 
to  assess  whether  indemnity  clause  can  be  upheld.  Kai  Krüger  highlights  that  liability 
regulations are now subject to control by § 36, and shows that there must be a critical question 
of "how far a liability clause – standard or individually designed - "seems unfair" and contrary 
to "good business practices" when taken respect to the total content, the parties' position and 
other circumstances..."122.
It can be thus said that the meaning of NL 5-1-2 is currently reduced and the courts will more 
often refer to Contracts Act to decide whether the knock-for-knock clause is valid, but NL 5-
1-2 remains important rule when the judge would like to highlight a conflict with morality.
7.3. The Norwegian Contracts Act
The Scandinavian law of contract is the result of several centuries of development 
where the seeds of a unity of legal interest were seen to emerge from at least the middle of the 
19th century123. The fundamental of contract law in Norway is the Contract Act enacted in 
1983, which forms a basis for discussion concerning validity of contractual provisions. The 
main provisions relevant in discourse concerning knock-for-knock clauses are  included in 
section 36 of this Act. 
Section 36 states:
“(1)  A  contract  may  be  modified  or  set  aside,  in  whole  or  in  part,  if  it  would  be  
unreasonable or at variance with the principles of good faith to enforce it. The same applies  
to other juristic acts. (2) In making a decision under subsection (1) hereof, regard shall be  
had to the circumstances existing at the time the contract was concluded, the terms of the  
contract and subsequent circumstances”.
Despite the fact that section 36 uses the word “agreement” (avtale), it is clear that not 
only the  contract  as  a  whole  can  be modified,  but  also  the  particular  provisions  in  such 
contract  might  be  changed as  well124.  If  the  clause  is  considered  to  be unfair,  it  is  most 
reasonable to waive the clause and leave the background law to apply to the case at hand (also 
partial waiver may be possible, so that the analysed provision will be without legal effect as 
far as it appears unreasonable)125. However, it should be stressed that there is no prohibition 
against making bad deals, so the agreement may be upheld even if one of the parties feels 
injustice. Moreover, it must be remembered that it is not judicial mission to modify a contract 
122 K. Krüger, Norsk kontraktsrett, 2. opplag, 1991, p.. 783
123 V. Hagstrøm, The Scandinavian Law of Obligations, Institute for Scandianvian Law 1957-2010, p. 118
124 G. Woxholth, Avtalerett, 7. utgave, 2009, p. 343
125 A. Bjerketveit, Indemnity- og hold harmless-klausuler i norsk rett, 
http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/english/research/projects/anglo/essays/bjerketveit.pdf, p. 121
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in such a way to compose a new agreement which could potentially lead to the parties being 
bound to something that is far beyond their abilities and intentions126.
The rules included in Norwegian Contracts Act and NL 5-1-2 are overlapping to the 
some extent, what means that courts have discretion to decide which statute will apply to the 
case at hand. The Contract Law focuses on the relations between the contracting parties (a 
judge have to thus consider whether those relations are unfair for one of them and shifting 
unreasonably the economical  burden),  the NL 5-1-2 considers instead the morality of the 
contract in general. By and large, the contract act will be chosen more often as it seems to be 
more neutral in its wording. In cases where both provisions are similarly applicable, judges 
will refer to NL 5-1-2 when they want to signify that the knock-for-knock clause does not 
only  construct  parties  relationships  against  to  good  business  practice,  but  that  it  is  also 
contrary to moral principles127. It can be said that very often the indemnity agreements which 
are immoral can also be judged as unreasonable for the parties128. The argument from NL 5-1-
2 can be therefore used f.e.  where the parties can obtain insurance covering their  part  of 
liability (so the contract cannot be judged as unfair from their perspective), but it may be 
simultaneously inconsistent with the moral rule that anyone should be released from liability 
for his own gross negligence or fraudulent act. On the other hand, a contract may be unfair 
without being immoral, for instance if a change of circumstances has resulted in a shift of the 
risk for damage making the knock-for-knock agreement unfair for one of the parties129. 
 In offshore context, the unreasonableness will be invoked to consider whether the 
party may be bound by its promise to keep the other party indemnified if the tort is caused by 
gross negligence of tortfeasor. Whether or not an exclusion of liability can be upheld will 
depend on an overall evaluation, based on the criteria of reasonableness found in section 36130. 
It means that even if the contractual provisions analysed separately seem to be unreasonable, 
the court must look at the whole contract and relations between the parties to decide whether 
those clauses may be declared unfair and be denied.  An important point is that there is a 
contract’s overall result (i.e. its effect on a performance stage) that should be considered and 
since  the  agreement  must  be  assessed  as  a  whole,  an  unfavourable  conditions  may  be 
outweighed by a condition that is favourable to the party131. The good example are knock-for-
knock agreements, where particular rules analysed in isolation may seem to unfairly shifting 
financial responsibility,  but when the contract is considered as a whole, it  is clear that its 
126 See: Woxholth, op.cit., p. 411
127 G. Woxholth, op.cit., p. 335, see also: Rt 2004 p. 1582
128 J. Hov, A. P. Høgberg, Alminnelig avtalerett, 2009, p. 324
129 T.-L. Wilhelmsen, op.cit., p. 24
130 V. Hagstrøm, Om grensene..., p. 630
131 Idem, Urimelige avtalevilkår, Lov og Rett 1994 p. 164
36
commitment reflects a corresponding duty of the parties. If this distribution of liability reflects 
a reasonable allocation of risk, the contract cannot be thus held to be unreasonable.
As  was  written  before,  a  court  have  to  look  at  the  performance  stage  when  an 
assessment  is  made  –  it  is  particularly  important  in  the  offshore  business  where  the 
contractual  relations  last  many  years.  The  parties  contractual  arrangement  and  mutual 
connections based on a contract that runs over many years could have changed since the 
agreement was signed, and the § 36 should reflect and capture the development in view of 
what is right and wrong132. It means that since relations system between the contracting parties 
may have changed since the contract was agreed, the argument of unreasonableness must be 
evaluated according to the actual  situation and actual  perception of parties  corresponding 
duties.
Originally,  it  was  thought  that  the  primary  scope  of  §  36  should  be  consumer 
protection (however, according to the preparatory documents it was clear that the provision 
should also apply to professional contracts133), but practice shows that the provision gradually 
has become more important also for contracts between professionals134.  Nevertheless, only 
once the provisions of section 36 have been analysed by the Norwegian Supreme Court in the 
context of liability in an agreement between professional parties135. However, the litigation 
concerned provisions of NSAB (the Nordic Freight Forwarder Agreement) which differ to the 
some  extent  from mutual  hold  harmless  clauses,  so  the  judgement  may  only  give  some 
guidance in the field of knock-for-knock agreements. NSAB is an agreed standard contract 
with a long tradition and it states that the freight forwarder’s liability for damage is limited 
unless  damage  is  caused  intentionally.136.  The  Norwegian  Supreme Court  considering  the 
limitation of liability in this context held that the disclaimer of liability is valid if it concerns 
the gross negligence of employee. The opinion could be thus different if the incident would be 
caused  by  the  fault  of  senior  employee  (identified  with  the  company’s  fault  –  see  the 
discussion in 7.2.). 
The additional guidelines can be found in Swedish and Danish legal theory and case 
law  since  these  Scandinavian  legal  systems  are  based  on  the  same  principles  and  the 
Norwegian section 36 is a result of Nordic legislative cooperation with identical rules in all 
the Nordic countries137. This is why the Swedish and Danish preparatory documents are highly 
relevant  here.  In  Swedish  preparatory  document  there  can  be  found  an  opinion  that  the 
132 E. Selvig,  Kontraktsrettens rettskildelære, I: Knophs oversikt over norsk rett, 11. utgave, 1998 p. 283
133 See:  NOU 1987:24 p. 47 and p. 61, SOU 1974:83 p. 111
134 V. Hagstrøm, M. Aarbakke, Obligasjonsrett, 2003, p. 278
135 Kaiinspektørdommen, Rt 1994, p. 626
136  NSAB 2000 § 22 cf. § 5. 
137 T.-L. Wilhelmsen, op.cit., p. 25
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application of limitation of liability clauses shall not be limited to a specific degree of fault, 
but it should rather depend on a total evaluation of the specifics of the actual contract. In cases 
where freedom of liability is tied to financing through insurance the main purpose will be to 
limit recourse from the insurer, and a convenient liability and insurance regime limiting the 
costs of recourse processes should not be denied through strict principles of fairness138. As a 
result, the indemnity provisions in professional agreements shall be treated differently than 
the same clauses in other contracts, especially when they are connected with insurance cover. 
The Danish courts are rather hesitant to exclude or limit liability for gross negligence, 
however they are willing to accept such exclusions when some conditions are fulfilled. There 
are  several  judgements  of  Danish  Supreme  Court  which  can  shed  little  light  on  the 
interpretation of limitation of  liability clauses,  however,  they concerned provisions of  the 
Nordic Freight Forwarder Agreement (NSAB), which, as was written before, might give some 
guidance also in the case of knock-for-knock clauses. In U 1993.851 the limitation clause was 
set aside by the Danish Supreme Court when the freight forwarder negligently failed to follow 
its own established practise for delivery of the goods. However, the limitation was accepted in 
newer cases, i.e. U 2005.243 and U 2006.632. In U 2005.243 the judges concluded that the 
provision must  be  accepted as  written also in  case of  gross  negligence.  The U 2006.632 
concerned the situation where the company had failed in the planning and performing of the 
service (it was not directly stated that the failure had been grossly negligent, but this seems to 
be presumed in the lower court, which set the limitation aside). The Danish Supreme Court 
referred to U 2005.243, and stated that the limitation could not be set aside according to the 
Contract  Act  §36 in  the  case  of  gross  negligence.  Main  arguments  were  that  the  freight 
forwarder contract is an agreed standard contract where the limitation is part of a total liability 
regime  which  presumably  rests  on  a  total  evaluation  where  considerations  of  efficient 
insurance played a central role139.
The similar approach was presented by the Maritime and Commercial Court in 2004 
which expressed that knock-for-knock provisions in BIMCO “TOWCON” charter party can 
be upheld since TOWCON is a charter party commonly used in the industry and developed 
with  participation  of  and under  the  influence  of  BIMCO. It  means  thus  that  shipowning 
companies  through BIMCO most  likely must  have  accepted  the  wording of  the  standard 
clause, and the allocation of risk and liability140. 
On  the  other  hand,  Danish  legal  theory  presents  rather  restrictive  position  on 
exclusions/limitation of liability – Gomard in “Obligationsret” stated that: 
138 SOU 1974:83 pp. 180-181; , T.-L. Wilhelmsen, op.cit., p. 26
139 Ibidem, p. 26
140 Ibidem, p. 23
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”An exclusion of liability does not include damage caused intentionally or through gross  
negligence […]. Creditor does not expect debitor to behave grossly negligent and debitor  
has  no  natural  need  to  protect  himself  from  liability  emanating  from  such  behaviour.  
However it cannot always be excluded that debitor may exempt himself from liability for, or  
at least liability for his employees’ intent or gross negligence. It cannot as a general rule be  
excluded that liability even for grave mistakes made by employees, against the wishes and  
instruction  of  management,  and  despite  reasonable  control,  may  be  exempt,  however  
presumably not for mistakes made by managerial personnel.141” 
The significance of section 36 in the case of knock-for-knock clauses is  restricted 
today  since  these  rules  will  rather  not  often  apply  to  commercial  contracts  between 
professional parties – to the extent it will apply, the threshold must be high142.  It should be 
remembered that business contracts are concluded to achieve profits and that the parties are 
aware  of  accompanied  risks.  Agreements  are  concluded  between  professionals  who  are 
assisted  by  expert  advice  and  they  are  subject  of  long  negotiations  between  the  parties. 
Moreover,  the  consideration  relating  to  predictability  of  contractual  relations  is  a  very 
important point, particularly in those sectors where the potential losses are large and where 
the parties must ensure their risks, such in the oil and gas industry. It must be noted that the 
mutual hold harmless provisions are introduced into contract to enable the parties an efficient 
risk allocation and that they bring more positive results than burdens (see: chapter 5.1.). It is  
thus generally recognised that adjusting and rewriting contracts according to the Contract Act 
section 36 in the oil  and gas  industry can only be done in  very special  circumstances.143 
Additionally,  in  the  case  of  knock-for-knock  contracts  parties  are  required  to  insure 
themselves against the losses they might be responsible for. In such case, all potential victims 
are secured and it is not a contracting party who suffers financial loss, but the insurer who are 
obliged to cover it. When the party has such protection, contractual risk allocation can hardly 
be said to be unreasonable in relation to him144. 
The criterion of unreasonableness is thus interpreted strictly – there must be a marked 
departure from the standard of reasonableness before the impact of the contract can claimed to 
be "unreasonable". Such a restrictive interpretation emphasizes that the provision is intended 
to be a safety valve on the contract area. The courts are thus unlikely to openly disregard an 
indemnity clause in a commercial contract based on section 36145. If an indemnity clause is 
141 Citation from: The Knock-for-Knock Principle under Danish Law, http://www.sandroos.dk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/Presentation-30-November-2010.pdf, p. 21
142 Rt. 2000 p. 806
143 ND 1990.204 NA Ula and ND 2000.240 NA Troll.
144 A. Bjerketveit, Indemnity- og hold harmless-klausuler...,  p.120
145 A. Bjerketveit, Indemnity- and Hold Harmless Clauses,   , p. 27
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found to be unreasonable,  it  is  therefore likely that the clause would rather be subject  to 
"hidden censorship" through restrictive interpretation or strict acceptance, than that it is open 
modified or set aside as contrary to § 36146.
7.4. The knock-for-knock agreements under Norwegian law – 
summary
Summing up, it can be said that the knock-for-knock clauses are generally accepted 
under  Norwegian  law,  however,  some limits  were  pointed  out  above.  The  main  problem 
concerns  liability  in  case  of  gross  negligence,  since  it  may seem against  the  morality  or 
reasonableness to indemnify a party at fault. On the other hand, the consideration supporting 
the  knock-for-knock  principle  in  offshore  contracts  are  so  strong  that  the  agreed 
indemnification may be upheld even in such circumstances147. 
It can be said that under Norwegian law courts tended to emphasize considerations of 
reasonableness more than predictability and freedom of contract, however, this practice seems 
to be changing today. A general impression now is an alteration in the attitude in favour of 
predictability at the cost of fairness, in particular in relation to later events resulting in more 
extensive losses than expected148.
Professor  Trine-Lise  Wilhelmsen  describes  the  approach  to  knock-for-knock 
provisions in Norway in the following words: 
“What can be concluded here is  that freedom of liability in cases where the damage is  
caused by gross negligence from the company itself can only be an issue if some minimum  
requirements  are  fulfilled:   The  contract  should  be  agreed  to  secure  involvement  and  
acceptance by both parties, the freedom of liability should be tied to a systematic insurance  
regulation to secure that all potential victims are compensated, the liability and insurance  
system should reflect a thorough analyses of what combination of liability insurance and  
casualty  insurance  is  most  convenient  for  the  parties,  and  the  system  should  reduce  
transactions costs. But even when these conditions are fulfilled, the acceptance from the  
court is still uncertain”149. 
146 Idem, Indemnity- og hold harmless-klausuler... p. 127 
147 Knock-for-knock clauses in offshore contracts, Wikborg Rein February 2009, p. 9
148 T.L. Wilhelmsen, op.cit., p. 24-25
149 T.L. Wilhelmsen, op.cit., p. 27-28
40
Summary
The knock-for-knock clauses are generally recognised and acknowledgement formulas 
allowing contracting parties effective risk allocation. Despite all the advantages, they are still 
among the most controversial aspects of the offshore contracts. On the one hand, there has 
been  not  so  many  litigations  concerning  their  enforceability  what  indicates  that  this 
mechanism  works  well  in  practice.  On  the  other  hand,  the  existing  cases  are  often 
contradictory and bring both some clarity and some additional problems at the same time.  
When knock-for-knock clause operates under Norwegian law the mandatory nullity 
rules, including the principle of good faith and fairness standards included in the Norwegian 
Contracts  Act   §  36  and  NL 5-2-1  must  be  taken  into  consideration.  In  the  US,  the 
enforceability of mutual hold harmless clauses depends to a great extent on the applicable law 
since different limits and requirements might undermine their meaning. Ipso factum, the same 
clause under Norwegian and  US law may be treated differently – where the US courts are 
rather willing to upheld the mutual hold harmless provisions if the wording is clear and they 
are good marked in the contract,  the Norwegian judges will  look rather at  the results the 
contract brings as a whole.
Unfortunately,  when  the  courts  seem to  have  become  more  sophisticated  in  their 
approach to mutual hold harmless provisions, the benefits of this method of pre-allocating risk 
are being eroded by the industry itself. More and more offshore agreements contain nowadays 
provisions that purport to exclude from the liability and indemnity regime losses caused by 
“gross negligence or wilful misconduct”. The parties may well have a clear idea in their own 
minds  about  the  meaning of  this  term,  but  the  practice  shows that  it  is  very difficult  to 
ascertain the proper application which the courts will assign to the words “gross negligence”. 
As  a  result,  the  most  important  benefit  of  knock-for-knock  clauses  –  certainty  of  risk 
allocation  –  is  highly  reduced.  When  the  parties  decide  to  include  “gross  negligence” 
exclusion, they leave thus to the court to determine exactly what degree of carelessness they 
intend to encompass by the provision. This will directly lead to the costly and time-consuming 
litigation, the solution which the parties of drilling contracts just try to avoid by including 
knock-for-knock clauses.
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